AIS Data Falsification - How Long Will It Be Before We Can No Longer TrustAIS?

This article takes an in-depth look at spoofing and jamming in global navigation satellite systems. It is well known that the Automated Identification System (AIS) is an important source of information for Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) and reveals its vulnerabilities and challenges for safe navigation and shipping. As an important subset of cyber threats affecting many maritime systems, AIS is exposed to the problem of tampering and reliability. The messages received can be inadvertently false, jammed or deliberately spoofed. Spoofing can be used for electronic warfare to disguise military activities in sensitive sea areas. However, recent events suggest that there is a similar interest in the falsification of AIS signals for commercial purposes. Indeed, the shipping industry is experiencing unprecedented fraudulent practices by tanker operators seeking to evade sanctions. Our research team identified and documented the falsified AIS positions of tankers transporting Russian crude oil in closed ship-to-ship (STS) transfers based on repeated cases of discrepancies between AIS position suggestions and satellite radar imagery. The data methods were used to reconstruct the true movements of certain tankers and some surprising behaviors were discovered. This led us to ask the question: how long will it be before we can no longer trust GNSS and AIS, and what can be done to mitigate deliberate electronic interference?