Secure Software/Hardware Hybrid In-Field Testing for System-on-Chip
Modern Systems-on-Chip (SoCs) incorporate built-in self-test (BIST) modules deeply integrated into the device's intellectual property (IP) blocks. Such modules handle hardware faults and defects during device operation. As such, BIST results potentially reveal the internal structure and state of the device under test (DUT) and hence open attack vectors. So-called result compaction can overcome this vulnerability by hiding the BIST chain structure but introduces the issues of aliasing and invalid signatures. Software-BIST provides a flexible solution, that can tackle these issues, but suffers from limited observability and fault coverage. In this paper, we hence introduce a low-overhead software/hardware hybrid approach that overcomes the mentioned limitations. It relies on (<tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$a$</tex>) keyed-hash message authentication code (KMAC) available on the <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$S$</tex> oC providing device-specific secure and valid signatures with zero aliasing and (b) the <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$S$</tex> oC processor for test scheduling hence increasing DUT availability. The proposed approach offers both on-chip- and remote-testing capabilities. We showcase a RISC-V-based <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$S$</tex> oC to demonstrate our approach, discussing system overhead and resulting compaction rates.
Authors
- Christian Ewert (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2404-5206)
- Saleh Mulhem (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7380-5270)
- Andrija Nešković (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0000-5031-2430)
- Amrit Poudel
Publication Details
- Published
- 2024-10-06
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/vlsi-soc62099.2024.10767817
- Citations
- 1
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.49