Performing Legality: When and Why Chinese Government Leaders Show Up in Court

Abstract Since 2015, Chinese government leaders have been required by law to appear in court when citizens sue their unit or to designate an employee to take their place. We frame this policy as a demand on leaders to “perform legality,” sacrificing their time to demonstrate how seriously the government takes legal proceedings. Drawing on an original dataset of 127,529 administrative lawsuits decided between 2015 and 2018, we investigate how often government leaders appear in Chinese courtrooms, and for which kinds of cases. Overall, leaders attended 24.72% of hearings. Contrary to the State Council's instructions to prioritize attendance in lawsuits that may spiral into protest or draw public attention, leaders are no more likely to attend cases involving multiple plaintiffs or repeat litigants. Instead, they appear more often in cases where plaintiffs are represented by lawyers. These findings demonstrate that leaders tend to sidestep the most contentious cases in the legal system, complicating the conventional wisdom that stability maintenance is the overriding concern driving officials’ behavior. Yet despite leaders’ conflict avoidance, China has continued to ask leaders to personally appear in court in contentious cases. This policy is unusual in comparative perspective, and highlights the key role played by courts in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s drive to re-train the bureaucracy to take law more seriously.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Chinese Political Science
Published
2024-11-28
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-024-09901-6
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Law in Society and Culture
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.07
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Performing Legality: When and Why Chinese Government Leaders Show Up in Court

Rachel E. Stern, Jieun Kim, Benjamin L. Liebman
1 citations
Journal of Chinese Political Science
Law in Society and Culture
4.07
article

Performing Legality: When and Why Chinese Government Leaders Show Up in Court

Rachel E. Stern, Jieun Kim, Benjamin L. Liebman
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Abstract Since 2015, Chinese government leaders have been required by law to appear in court when citizens sue their unit or to designate an employee to take their place. We frame this policy as a demand on leaders to “perform legality,” sacrificing their time to demonstrate how seriously the government takes legal proceedings. Drawing on an original dataset of 127,529 administrative lawsuits decided between 2015 and 2018, we investigate how often government leaders appear in Chinese courtrooms, and for which kinds of cases. Overall, leaders attended 24.72% of hearings. Contrary to the State Council's instructions to prioritize attendance in lawsuits that may spiral into protest or draw public attention, leaders are no more likely to attend cases involving multiple plaintiffs or repeat litigants. Instead, they appear more often in cases where plaintiffs are represented by lawyers. These findings demonstrate that leaders tend to sidestep the most contentious cases in the legal system, complicating the conventional wisdom that stability maintenance is the overriding concern driving officials’ behavior. Yet despite leaders’ conflict avoidance, China has continued to ask leaders to personally appear in court in contentious cases. This policy is unusual in comparative perspective, and highlights the key role played by courts in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s drive to re-train the bureaucracy to take law more seriously.

Journal of Chinese Political ScienceVol. 31(1)
New York University Shanghai (CN)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 7%
Law in Society and Culture
4.07
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.