Political Patronage and the Labour Market Experience of High-Skilled Workers: Mixed Methods Evidence from Sierra Leone

Abstract This paper explores how political patronage can affect the labour market experience of high-skilled workers, and how jobseekers respond in such instances. A budding, primarily quantitative, literature has assessed corruption and labour market outcomes, but little has been written on how agents navigate corrupt practices and political patronage in the labour market. A mixed methods design is used, drawing on survey and focus group data from Sierra Leone. Findings show that when recruitment decisions are influenced by political connections ahead of merit, there is wide perceptions of unfairness in the labour market. Political patronage and corrupt practices in the labour market affect the allocation of jobs, how long it takes for some jobseekers to find jobs, and the quality of the match. Jobseekers respond to such practices by reducing job search and/or limiting search to particular sectors and jobs. In Sierra Leone, this primarily emerges as the development sector.