Distributed Resilient Control With Local Correction for Microgrids Against Cyberattacks on Communication Links

Distributed average consensus controls are widely used in microgrids to achieve average regulation, i.e., the average voltage and frequency regulation, the reactive and active power sharing. However, such controls are highly dependent on the communication network, which is vulnerable to cyberattacks that can cause the system operation to deviate from the desired point or even cause serious consequences of destabilization. In this paper, a distributed resilient average estimator based on competitive interconnections is first proposed. It is proven that the proposed estimator can achieve average estimation of input signals in the presence of bounded cyberattacks. Based on this, a distributed resilient control is developed to achieve the control objectives of average regulation regardless of cyberattacks. Moreover, a local corrective control is introduced to correct the over-limit behavior for voltage and frequency caused by over-boundary cyberattacks. According to the Takagi-Sugeno (TS) fuzzy modeling, the resilience of the proposed control strategy against cyberattacks can be evaluated. Then, a design algorithm for the control parameters is given to endow the proposed method with better performance. Finally, a hardware-in-the-loop platform for islanded microgrid is built and the effectiveness of the proposed control against cyberattacks is verified.