Unveiling the nature of philosophical problems: Formal and conceptual aspects

Abstract This paper approximates an intensional definitional distinction between philosophical problems and non‐philosophical problems. It contends that a philosophical problem consists of an inconsistent set M of propositions that satisfies certain characteristics. Among these are its minimality, the plausibility of its individual propositions, the non‐empirical character of some of these propositions, and the fact that a discursive context exists within which some of M 's non‐mathematical non‐empirical propositions are challenged by argument. The extrinsic and pragmatic criterion marks the key novelty of the presented definition. Building on the analysed concept of a philosophical problem, the paper explores the question of how the definition relates to philosophy as a discipline, whether it should be interpreted as descriptively adequate and exclusive, and whether there is space for genuine philosophical research that does not deal with philosophical problems in the presented sense.