Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles

Five classical and uncontroversial axioms—symmetry, weak Pareto optimality, restricted monotonicity, midpoint domination, and superadditivity—characterize a bargaining solution. It assigns to each player their midpoint, that is, the n -th share of their utopia point, and equally divides what remains.

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Publication Details

Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Published
2024-11-26
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.009
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
1.13
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article

Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles

Shiran Rachmilevitch, Dominik Karos
1 citations
Games and Economic Behavior
Game Theory and Voting Systems
1.13
article

Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles

Shiran Rachmilevitch, Dominik Karos
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Five classical and uncontroversial axioms—symmetry, weak Pareto optimality, restricted monotonicity, midpoint domination, and superadditivity—characterize a bargaining solution. It assigns to each player their midpoint, that is, the n -th share of their utopia point, and equally divides what remains.

Games and Economic BehaviorVol. 149
Bielefeld University (DE), Carmel (Israel) (IL), University of Haifa (IL)
Zero hunger
Openalex Percentile: Top 11%
Game Theory and Voting Systems
1.13
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