Balancing collaborative investment with opportunity costs in a carbon complementary supply chain

Purpose The carbon complementary supply chain (CCSC) is a collaborative framework that facilitates internal carbon credit trading agreements among supply chain agents in compliance with prevailing carbon regulations. Such agreements are highly beneficial, prompting agents to consider joint investment in emission reduction initiatives. However, capital investments come with inevitable opportunity costs, compelling agents to weigh the potential revenue from collaborative investments against these costs. Thus, this paper mainly explores carbon abatement strategies and operational decisions of the CCSC members and the influence of opportunity costs on the strategic choice of cooperative and noncooperative investment. Design/methodology/approach The authors propose a novel biform game-based theoretical framework that captures the interplay of pricing competition and investment cooperation among CCSC agents and assesses the impact of opportunity costs on CCSC profits and social welfare. Besides, the authors also compare the biform game-based collaborative scenario (Model B) to the noncooperative investment scenario (Model N) to investigate the conditions under which collaborative investment is most effective. Findings The biform game-based collaborative investment strategy enhances the economic performance of the traditional energy manufacturer, who bears the risk of opportunity costs, as well as the retailer. Additionally, it incentivizes the renewable energy manufacturer to improve environmental performance through renewable projects. Originality/value This research contributes significantly by establishing a theoretical framework that integrates the concepts of opportunity costs and biform game theory, offering new insights into the strategic management of carbon emissions within supply chains.