Safety Analysis and Research Based on Multi-Stage Game and Integrated Energy System Security Domain

In this article, the safety problem in the integrated energy system is solved using the game theory method. Combined with the characteristics of integrated energy system with multiple time scales and coupled energy flows, a three-stage multi-subject game model containing 0–1 variables is established, and for the definition and analysis of system safety, N-1 failures are considered, and the concept of dynamic safety domain is adopted to measure system safety. Appropriate simplifications were made for the model and it was transformed into a two-stage dynamic game model with incomplete information. Concepts such as N-1 safety criterion and safety margin are used to define the payoffs of both sides of the game, and the game equilibrium is solved to provide support for system safety prevention.

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Publication Details

Published
2024-11-06
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/scems63294.2024.10756425
Primary Topic
Smart Grid and Power Systems
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Safety Analysis and Research Based on Multi-Stage Game and Integrated Energy System Security Domain

Qinglai Guo, Bin Wang, Hongbin Sun, Minghao Zhang
Smart Grid and Power Systems
article

Safety Analysis and Research Based on Multi-Stage Game and Integrated Energy System Security Domain

Qinglai Guo, Bin Wang, Hongbin Sun, Minghao Zhang
article en

Abstract

In this article, the safety problem in the integrated energy system is solved using the game theory method. Combined with the characteristics of integrated energy system with multiple time scales and coupled energy flows, a three-stage multi-subject game model containing 0–1 variables is established, and for the definition and analysis of system safety, N-1 failures are considered, and the concept of dynamic safety domain is adopted to measure system safety. Appropriate simplifications were made for the model and it was transformed into a two-stage dynamic game model with incomplete information. Concepts such as N-1 safety criterion and safety margin are used to define the payoffs of both sides of the game, and the game equilibrium is solved to provide support for system safety prevention.

Tsinghua University (CN)
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Affordable and clean energy
Openalex Percentile: Top 81%
Smart Grid and Power Systems
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