Elite fidelity in Europe’s crisis management regime

How policy elites occupy positions within broader governance architectures is important in understanding how crisis management regimes are produced to respond to macroeconomic woes. We examine the crisis management regime forged to address Europe’s recent economic crisis and the policy elites holding top management positions in the supranational economic governance bodies constituting this European crisis management regime: the European Central Bank, European Fund for Strategic Investments, the European Investment Bank, and the European Stability Mechanism. The career and educational characteristics of elites embroiled in this ‘command situation’ are examined, as is their location in elite policy networks. In contrast to many studies of contemporary elites wielding political and economic power, we find that below the very top tier Europe’s policy elites have conventional careers with little public–private mobility or high-end educational prestige. Furthermore, these elites have ‘fidelity’ in staying with public organizations. Coherence in the European crisis management regime reflects these characteristics, which then combined with regional power asymmetries. Our findings contribute to the emerging literature in comparative field analysis in international financial institutions and suggest that studies of elites must carefully consider regional characteristics so as to not over-generalize elites as Ivy League-educated transnational pragmatists who float between private and public realms.