Anger expressions and coercive credibility in international crises

Abstract Why are some threats more credible than others? I argue that leaders’ anger expressions are a previously underappreciated source of coercive credibility. Specifically, leaders who express anger appear more credible because targets believe they are less sensitive to the costs of conflict. I test this argument through quantitative analysis of a novel dataset of world leaders’ public statements in crises from 1946 to 1996 and a U.S.‐based survey experiment designed to test the mechanism. The observational evidence reveals that anger expressions increase the likelihood a threat will succeed. The experiment shows that anger expressions cause targets to infer greater resolve and that non‐angry threats carry little credibility—and might even backfire. These findings not only shed light on a unique source of threat credibility but also highlight the crucial role of emotions in international relations with new data measuring political leaders’ emotional expressions over time and space.