Advanced security framework for low Earth orbit satellites in space information network

Recently, low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites have emerged as key players in space information network (SIN) due to their ability to provide global coverage. However, they remain susceptible to threats such as denial of service (DoS), man-in-the-middle (MITM), and spoofing attacks. In this paper, we propose a cross-layer security framework (CLSF) to address these vulnerabilities. Our approach begins by employing a physically unclonable function (PUF) at the upper layer to establish mutual authentication between legitimate satellites and ground stations, while also securely exchanging frequency seeds for the next phase. Following this, dynamic seed frequency hopping (DSFH) is applied at the physical layer to counter DoS, MITM, and spoofing attacks. Additionally, the frequency transitions of malicious satellites are modeled using a Markov chain. Our results demonstrate that the proposed CLSF, which integrates PUF and DSFH, delivers strong security performance.

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Publication Details

Journal
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Published
2024-11-23
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1186/s13638-024-02417-w
Citations
4
Primary Topic
Opportunistic and Delay-Tolerant Networks
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
1.40

Funders

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article

Advanced security framework for low Earth orbit satellites in space information network

Fayez Gebali, Ali Mansour, Ayman Al-Ahwal, Mohammed Abdrabou et al.
4 citations
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Opportunistic and Delay-Tolerant Networks
1.40
article

Advanced security framework for low Earth orbit satellites in space information network

Fayez Gebali, Ali Mansour, Ayman Al-Ahwal, Mohammed Abdrabou, Ala Saleh Alluhaidan, Mahmoud A. Shawky, Tamer Shamseldin, Sahar A. El-Rahman
article en
4 citations

Abstract

Recently, low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites have emerged as key players in space information network (SIN) due to their ability to provide global coverage. However, they remain susceptible to threats such as denial of service (DoS), man-in-the-middle (MITM), and spoofing attacks. In this paper, we propose a cross-layer security framework (CLSF) to address these vulnerabilities. Our approach begins by employing a physically unclonable function (PUF) at the upper layer to establish mutual authentication between legitimate satellites and ground stations, while also securely exchanging frequency seeds for the next phase. Following this, dynamic seed frequency hopping (DSFH) is applied at the physical layer to counter DoS, MITM, and spoofing attacks. Additionally, the frequency transitions of malicious satellites are modeled using a Markov chain. Our results demonstrate that the proposed CLSF, which integrates PUF and DSFH, delivers strong security performance.

EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and NetworkingVol. 2024(1)
Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University (SA), Benha University (EG), University of Victoria (CA), Military Technical College (EG), Misr International University (EG), University of Glasgow (GB)
Princess Nourah Bint Abdulrahman University, Deanship of Scientific Research, Princess Nourah Bint Abdulrahman University
Openalex Percentile: Top 16%
Opportunistic and Delay-Tolerant Networks
1.40
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Advanced security framework for low Earth orbit satellites in space information network — Fayez Gebali, Ali Mansour, et al. · EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS