Computing with Time: Microarchitectural Weird Machines

Side-channel attacks, such as Spectre, rely on properties of modern CPUs that permit discovery of microarchitectural state via timing of various operations. The Weird Machine concept is an increasingly popular model for characterization of execution that emerges from side-effects of conventional computing constructs. In this work we introduce Microarchitectural Weird Machines ( <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"> <mml:mi>μ</mml:mi> </mml:math> WMs): code constructions that allow performing computation through the means of side effects and conflicts between microarchitectual entities such as branch predictors and caches. The results of such computations are observed as timing variations in the execution of instructions that interact with these side effects. We demonstrate how <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"> <mml:mi>μ</mml:mi> </mml:math> WMs can be used as a powerful obfuscation engine where computation operates using events unobservable to conventional anti-obfuscation tools based on emulation, debugging, static and dynamic analysis techniques. We present a practical example in which we use a <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"> <mml:mi>μ</mml:mi> </mml:math> WM to obfuscate malware code such that its passive operation is invisible to an observer with full power to view the architectural state of the system until the code receives a trigger. When the trigger is received the malware decrypts and executes its payload. To show the effectiveness of obfuscation we demonstrate its use in the concealment and subsequent execution of a payload that creates a reverse shell. In the full version of this work we also demonstrate a payload that exfiltrates a shadow password file. We then demonstrate the generality of <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"> <mml:mi>μ</mml:mi> </mml:math> WMs by showing that they can be used to reliably perform non-trivial computation by implementing a SHA-1 hash function.

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Publication Details

Journal
Communications of the ACM
Published
2024-11-22
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1145/3610722
Primary Topic
Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Computing with Time: Microarchitectural Weird Machines

Angelo Sapello, Jesse Elwell, Thomas S. Benjamin, Jan U.H. Eitel et al.
Communications of the ACM
Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
article

Computing with Time: Microarchitectural Weird Machines

Angelo Sapello, Jesse Elwell, Thomas S. Benjamin, Jan U.H. Eitel, Dmitry Evtyushkin, Abhrajit Ghosh
article en

Abstract

Side-channel attacks, such as Spectre, rely on properties of modern CPUs that permit discovery of microarchitectural state via timing of various operations. The Weird Machine concept is an increasingly popular model for characterization of execution that emerges from side-effects of conventional computing constructs. In this work we introduce Microarchitectural Weird Machines ( <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"> <mml:mi>μ</mml:mi> </mml:math> WMs): code constructions that allow performing computation through the means of side effects and conflicts between microarchitectual entities such as branch predictors and caches. The results of such computations are observed as timing variations in the execution of instructions that interact with these side effects. We demonstrate how <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"> <mml:mi>μ</mml:mi> </mml:math> WMs can be used as a powerful obfuscation engine where computation operates using events unobservable to conventional anti-obfuscation tools based on emulation, debugging, static and dynamic analysis techniques. We present a practical example in which we use a <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"> <mml:mi>μ</mml:mi> </mml:math> WM to obfuscate malware code such that its passive operation is invisible to an observer with full power to view the architectural state of the system until the code receives a trigger. When the trigger is received the malware decrypts and executes its payload. To show the effectiveness of obfuscation we demonstrate its use in the concealment and subsequent execution of a payload that creates a reverse shell. In the full version of this work we also demonstrate a payload that exfiltrates a shadow password file. We then demonstrate the generality of <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"> <mml:mi>μ</mml:mi> </mml:math> WMs by showing that they can be used to reliably perform non-trivial computation by implementing a SHA-1 hash function.

Communications of the ACMVol. 67(12)
William & Mary (US), Williams (United States) (US), Meta (United States) (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 77%
Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
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