An introduction to the “balance of fear”: case studies of North Korea’s challenge to the United States and South Korea’s KMPR against North Korea

In late 2023, North Korea announced its intention to attack and annex South Korea despite the US’ nuclear umbrella for South Korea. Simultaneously, South Korea has been threatening a its decapitation operation against the North Korean leader. How does a small nuclear state, North Korea, ignore the nuclear umbrella of the United States, the nuclear superpower, and a non-nuclear South Korea challenge North Korea? This article introduces the “balance of fear” concept to search for answers to these two questions. It argues that the conventional “balance of terror” concept and the “balance of resolve” concept as well cannot provide a sufficient answer. In contrast, the balance of fear concept explains that not the strength of nuclear forces, but the amount of fear decides the failure or success in deterrence: North Korean leaders may have less fear for US massive retaliation than the US leaders’ fear for North Korea’s suicidal nuclear attack on US cities.

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Publication Details

Journal
Defense and Security Analysis
Published
2024-11-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2024.2426853
Primary Topic
Nuclear Issues and Defense
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

An introduction to the “balance of fear”: case studies of North Korea’s challenge to the United States and South Korea’s KMPR against North Korea

Hwee‐rhak Park
Defense and Security Analysis
Nuclear Issues and Defense
article

An introduction to the “balance of fear”: case studies of North Korea’s challenge to the United States and South Korea’s KMPR against North Korea

Hwee‐rhak Park
article en

Abstract

In late 2023, North Korea announced its intention to attack and annex South Korea despite the US’ nuclear umbrella for South Korea. Simultaneously, South Korea has been threatening a its decapitation operation against the North Korean leader. How does a small nuclear state, North Korea, ignore the nuclear umbrella of the United States, the nuclear superpower, and a non-nuclear South Korea challenge North Korea? This article introduces the “balance of fear” concept to search for answers to these two questions. It argues that the conventional “balance of terror” concept and the “balance of resolve” concept as well cannot provide a sufficient answer. In contrast, the balance of fear concept explains that not the strength of nuclear forces, but the amount of fear decides the failure or success in deterrence: North Korean leaders may have less fear for US massive retaliation than the US leaders’ fear for North Korea’s suicidal nuclear attack on US cities.

Defense and Security AnalysisVol. 41(2)
Kookmin University (KR)
Openalex Percentile: Top 67%
Nuclear Issues and Defense
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