Quality not quantity: Lobbying institutions and the influence of asylum rights groups

With participation in electoral politics limited, asylum seekers rely on lobbying to influence policy, but the factors which facilitate or constrain this process remain unclear. I interview asylum rights lobbyists in Germany and the United Kingdom to study the effects of lobbying institutions, using process tracing to identify influence mechanisms. Contrary to previous research, I find that successful lobbying stems from the quality not the quantity of institutions. I show how Germany’s corporatist institutions provide stable lobbying structures, building trustful working relationships. This enables collaborative policymaking and increases opportunities for influence. Informal, inconsistent structures in the United Kingdom’s pluralist system impair trust, reducing collaborative policymaking and influence. UK institutions are more policy responsive, however, enabling groups to capitalise on favourable public opinion, whereas the German system remains stable. The results demonstrate the effects of institutional arrangements and identify mechanisms which can improve policy outcomes for asylum seekers and other disadvantaged groups.