How to match protections along with skills? Limitations of the match‐motive matrix for temporary migrant workers

The 2023 World Development Report on Migration Migrants, Refugees and Societies (WDR, 2023) responds to increasing calls to ensure that migration routes are ‘safe, orderly and regular’. This framework proposes to match the motives of migrants with the needs of destination economies. The Match-Motive matrix, which forms the foundation of the WDR, is proposed by World Bank colleagues as a framework for accruing better gains from migration, both for countries of destination and origin and for migrants and refugees themselves. Drawing from concepts in labour economics (‘match’) and international law (‘motive’), the Match-Motive matrix accounts for the economics of matching migrant skills and attributes with destination needs. The goal is to maximize benefits and minimize costs of migration, understand the motives driving migrants, and the impacts of these migrants on destination context from an international law perspective. The Match-Move Matrix thus categorizes four types of migrant movements, ranging from the preferred free movement of ‘economic migrants’ to the undesirable unfree movement of distressed refugees whose skills are often unrecognized and other migrants with low skills to match (World Bank, 2023, p. 6). This approach to migration management is aimed at harmonizing migration policy in both countries of destination and origin, reducing clandestine movements and mitigating humanitarian crises. Temporary migration regimes, which are championed by the WDR 2023, are often seen as a viable political compromise that appeals to both migrants (who seek legal status and work authorization) and employers (who seek flexible labour). The financial and social costs of these temporary migration programmes are high. While some critics advocate incremental reforms, others suggest a move away from temporary regimes altogether, and others critique the very distinction of migrants with ‘low’ versus ‘high’ skills. We revisit their concerns here. The WDR 2023 focuses on skill-matching programmes that could ensure a smooth flow of skilled labour, and in turn remittances to origin economies. This synergy between the needs of destination and host countries is offered as a way to ensure safe and orderly routes of migration, a key target of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, 2024). This scheme also aims to reduce both the financial and social costs of migration through Memoranda of Understanding between origin and destination countries that would also regulate labour brokers. Countries of employment have long promulgated immigration regimes that prioritize granting visas to migrants with coveted skills. Some, like the Philippines, Indonesia, Nepal and India have state-run centres dedicated to curating skilled workers ready for the global labour force (Rodriguez, 2010). These schemes are deeply flawed, in both conception and implementation, highlighting the limitations of the WDR 2023 Match-Motive Matrix. On its face, the WDR 2023 Match-Motive Matrix has the potential to better align migration corridors. However, the conception and categorization of skills (desired by destination countries and provided by countries of origin), say nothing of the inherently vulnerable structure of temporary labour regimes. Temporary migrants, even if skilled, often work in inhumane conditions, fuelled by visas tied to the sponsor-employer. Countries of origin like India classify and categorize their workers according to skill-based categorization of occupations to ostensibly ensure at least a baseline workplace protection, particularly for the ‘unskilled’ workers across a variety of industries like construction (Sasikumar & Sharma, 2016). However, countries of origin have significantly lower bargaining power to shape these regimes, and Iskander (2021)'s research reveals how both the state and private companies at destinations re-make skill categorization according to their requirements, rendering workers effectively ‘unskilled’. This recategorization acts to discipline workers, further constraining their ability to contest their precarious conditions. As such, skill-matching—that is, premising the legal right to migrate on the utility of a migrant's skill and economic contribution—fuels migrant precarity. This is the centrepiece of temporary migration schemes and employment-based immigration regimes based on a points system. Many emigrant management programmes, too, fixate on skill, with little regard for migrant's social reproduction and social integration needs. While it is true that skills play a vital role in lessening the costs of integration, this locks in a path to integration that sees migrants only as skilled and temporary labour inputs, with visas predicated on these assets. This can be especially challenging for refugees, whose skills can be difficult to ascertain, cultivate, and match (Kreisberg et al., 2024). Meanwhile, the social costs of migration, especially family migration in the wake of trauma and displacement, remain high as governments withhold policy interventions such as jobs programmes, extended family reunification and robust access to justice to ease transition to integration, which are also inextricably linked with domestic policies and pressures (See Axster & Riedl, forthcoming). As the WDR 2023 attests, millions of workers in various sectors all over the world are temporary workers. Some, but not all, enjoy renewable visa status. For example, a vast majority are in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain), where foreign workers often outnumber native-born workers and where worker exploitation and abuse are rampant. This exploitation is not simply because of limited state protections, although, many critiques have been made of the continually reforming kafala system (see for example Parreñas, 2021). Globally, the precarity of temporary foreign workers (both ‘high’ and ‘low’-skilled) stems from the disproportionate power afforded to employers to choose whether to rehire/renew a worker in future seasons, the impunity of abusive employers and fraudulent labour intermediaries alike, and the crushing debt imposed by even the legitimate intermediaries (Costa, 2021). These challenges are compounded by the fundamental failure of most countries of origin to meaningfully protect their emigrant workers labouring abroad—despite the proliferation of international norms to protect migrant rights (see Kysel, forthcoming), and even in Western democracies where laws on the books protecting migrant workers are relatively stronger (Bada & Gleeson, 2023; Stringer & Michailova, 2019; Vosko, 2018). This reality was pulled into particular focus during the COVID-19 pandemic, when temporary workers in various parts of the world had their contracts summarily terminated and were sent back home with no redress from their employers or host governments. They received no benefits or salaries owed during this period of uncertain dismissal and were left with no process of grievance redressal in either the destinations or their home countries (Foley & Piper, 2021). While efforts in the United States relaxed requirements in order to retain ‘essential workers’, these exceptions were short-lived (Federal Register, 2020). The logistics of skills matching have not been fully taken into account by proponents of the Match-Motive Matrix. How will origin and destination governments measure the skills of migrants and track their application in host economies? While ideal for researchers (like us) interested in tracking mobility, this tracking would require identifying and surveilling migrants throughout the migration process, from departure to return. This process fundamentally hardens the role of the origin and destination governments into more than simply labour protectors and integrators, but also national security investigators, inherently focused on the rule of law and economic extraction. Any utility this brings to the matching process presents major trade-offs for democracy and civil rights. The examples of Fortress Europe reveal how the surveillance of, for example, posted workers, became part and parcel of migrant worker tracking that drives precarity, as well as detection, detention and sometimes removal (Arnholtz & Lillie, 2019; Wagner, 2018). As India develops a new paradigm for its ever-growing emigrant workforce, similar tensions between protection and surveillance are increasing. The eMigrate programme, instituted by the Indian government in 2015, extends state surveillance in ways that echo colonial pasts. These logics are based on historical and racial hierarchies rooted in existing Hindu caste society, as well as class, ethnic and gender inequalities (Buckley et al., 2023, p. 107), and their deployment is justified by the sovereignty of the destination country (Suri & Kumar, 2020). Under whose authority, the UAE may ask, will the Indian government track and surveil its co-nationals and their employers in the host countries (Haidar, 2017)? Indeed, will country of origin surveillance enhance labour protection, or further labour discipline (Breslin et al., 2011, p. 22)? Similarly, how will diplomatic relations shake up the rational logic of these matches? For example, Indians have been working in Israel as part of an agreement signed in November 2023 (Ross, 2024). As the mass killings in Palestine continue to unfold, with what justification will ‘perfectly matched’ temporary Indian and other workers fill the labour force void during and in the wake of this devastation? Far beyond skill supply and demand, indeed, geopolitics and international law will continue to matter too for determining migrant decision-making and the proclivities of host countries (Chatterjee Miller, 2024). While the skill Match-Motive Matrix aspires to harmonize migration corridors and maximize the financial and human capital benefits of migration, relying on these categories will not alone ensure the overall well-being of migrant workers. A more robust framework prioritizing access to justice is needed to ensure ethical recruitment of both temporary foreign worker and migrants in newer temporary categories (e.g., study-work visitors) who are guestworkers by any other name (Vosko, 2022). Both origin and destination governments share this responsibility, as do employers. Several advocates have also proposed frameworks for fair recruitment and management practices, in the tradition of corporate social responsibility (Institute for Human Rights and Business, 2024). The WDR 2023 is arguably novel in bringing together the typically uniform focus on economic considerations with a focus on rights and the law (World Bank, 2023, p. 1). However, it also largely fails to consider the problem of return migration, portability of justice and benefits, and re-integration into the labour force and social context of origin communities. The fickle nature of guestworker programmes, and the increasing reliance on them by country-of-origin-governments (often at the expense of local development and social protection), suggest a Plan B is necessary when the ideals of skills matching fail, in order to ensure both the right to safely migrate and the right to stay home and return. The opinions expressed in this Commentary are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors, Editorial Board, International Organization for Migration nor John Wiley & Sons. NA.