Modeling of Collusion Behavior in the Electrical Market Based on Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient
The evolution of the electricity market has brought the issues of market equilibrium and collusion to the forefront of attention. This paper introduces the Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) algorithm on the IEEE three-bus electrical market model. Specifically, it simulates the behavior of market participants through reinforcement learning (DDPG), and Nash equilibrium and the collusive equilibrium of the power market are simulated by setting different reward functions. The results show that, compared with the Nash equilibrium, collusion equilibrium can increase the price of nodal marginal electricity and reduce total social welfare.
Authors
- Ye Guo (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5268-5289)
- Chunyan Li (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2180-9784)
- Chen Meng (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5875-1400)
- Zhongshi He (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0007-3682-0464)
- J. P. Chen
- Yifeng Liu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0009-0097-9873)
Institutions
- Tsinghua–Berkeley Shenzhen Institute (CN)
- Tsinghua University (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Energies
- Published
- 2024-11-20
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.3390/en17225807
- Citations
- 3
- Primary Topic
- Electric Power System Optimization
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.63