FinTech vs. Bank: The impact of lending technology on credit market competition

Does the recent proliferation of technology in lending process have an impact on business loan market competition? Using a theoretical model that assumes heterogeneity in lenders’ screening abilities and borrowers’ investment horizons, we show that FinTech (Traditional) lenders primarily supply unsecured (asset-backed) loans to borrowers with short-term (long-term) projects. The model builds on the interplay between screening ability and collateral requirements to characterize the competition between two ex-ante symmetric lenders. Lenders use screening technology and collateral requirements to mitigate competition and restrict the supply of credit through an endogenous segmentation of the loan market. As information technology improves, the effect on credit supply and equilibrium interest rates becomes more nuanced and depends on the market segment. The results offer a supply-side explanation for the growth of unsecured lending.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Banking & Finance
Published
2024-11-20
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107338
Citations
9
Primary Topic
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.85
Controls
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article

FinTech vs. Bank: The impact of lending technology on credit market competition

Kejia Wu, Panagiotis Avramidis, Konstantinos Serfes
9 citations
Journal of Banking & Finance
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
4.85
article

FinTech vs. Bank: The impact of lending technology on credit market competition

Kejia Wu, Panagiotis Avramidis, Konstantinos Serfes
article en
9 citations

Abstract

Does the recent proliferation of technology in lending process have an impact on business loan market competition? Using a theoretical model that assumes heterogeneity in lenders’ screening abilities and borrowers’ investment horizons, we show that FinTech (Traditional) lenders primarily supply unsecured (asset-backed) loans to borrowers with short-term (long-term) projects. The model builds on the interplay between screening ability and collateral requirements to characterize the competition between two ex-ante symmetric lenders. Lenders use screening technology and collateral requirements to mitigate competition and restrict the supply of credit through an endogenous segmentation of the loan market. As information technology improves, the effect on credit supply and equilibrium interest rates becomes more nuanced and depends on the market segment. The results offer a supply-side explanation for the growth of unsecured lending.

Journal of Banking & FinanceVol. 170
The American College of Greece (GR), Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (US), Drexel University (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
4.85
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