Dual-Frequency Multi-Constellation Global Navigation Satellite System/Inertial Measurements Unit Tight Hybridization for Urban Air Mobility Applications

A global navigation satellite system (GNSS) for remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPASs) positioning is essential, thanks to the worldwide availability and continuity of this technology in the provision of positioning services. This makes the GNSS technology a critical element as malfunctions impacting on the determination of the position, velocity and timing (PVT) solution could determine safety issues. Such an aspect is particularly challenging in urban air mobility (UAM) scenarios, where low satellite visibility, multipath, radio frequency interference and cyber threats can dangerously affect the PVT solution. So, to meet integrity requirements, GNSS receiver measurements are augmented/fused with other aircraft sensors that can supply position and/or velocity information on the aircraft without relying on any other satellite and/or ground infrastructures. In this framework, in this paper, the algorithms of a hybrid navigation unit (HNU) for UAM applications are detailed, implementing a tightly coupled sensor fusion between a dual-frequency multi-constellation GNSS receiver, an inertial measurements unit and the barometric altitude from an air data computer. The implemented navigation algorithm is integrated with autonomous fault detection and exclusion of GPS/Galileo/BeiDou satellites and the estimation of navigation solution integrity/accuracy (i.e., protection level and figures of merit). In-flight tests were performed to validate the HNU functionalities demonstrating its effectiveness in UAM scenarios even in the presence of cyber threats. In detail, the navigation solution, compared with a real-time kinematic GPS receiver used as the reference centimetre-level position sensor, demonstrated good accuracy, with position errors below 15 m horizontally and 10 m vertically under nominal conditions (i.e., urban scenarios characterized by satellite low visibility and multipath). It continued to provide a valid navigation solution even in the presence of off-nominal events, such as spoofing attacks. The cyber threats were correctly detected and excluded by the system through the indication of the valid/not valid satellite measurements. However, the results indicate a need for fine-tuning the EKF to improve the estimation of figures of merit and protection levels associated to the navigation solution during the cyber-attacks. In contrast, solution accuracy and integrity indicators are well estimated in nominal conditions.