Hardware/Software Runtime for GPSA Protection in RISC-V Embedded Cores
State-of-the-art hardware countermeasures against fault attacks are based, among others, on control-flow and code integrity checking. Generalized Path Signature Analysis and Continuous Signature Monitoring can assert these integrity properties. However, supporting such mechanisms requires a dedicated compiler flow and does not support indirect jumps. This work proposes a technique based on a hardware/software runtime to generate those signatures while executing unmodified off-the-shelf RISC-V binaries. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first solution for providing this level of protection against fault injection on unmodified binaries. The proposed approach has been implemented on a pipelined processor, and experimental results show an average slowdown of ×3.35 and an area overhead of at least ×1.86 compared to unprotected implementations.
Authors
- Simon Rokicki (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0195-096X)
- Steven Derrien (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6281-083X)
- Louis Savary
Institutions
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique (FR)
- Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires (FR)
- Université de Rennes (FR)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-03-31
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.23919/date64628.2025.10993188
- Citations
- 1
- Primary Topic
- Real-Time Systems Scheduling
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 2.27