Measuring and Characterizing Propagation of Reuse RSA Certificates and Keys Across PKI Ecosystem

The insecurities of public-key infrastructure on the Internet have been the focus of research for over a decade. The extensive presence of broken, weak, and vulnerable cryptographic keys has been repeatedly emphasized by many studies. Analyzing the security implications of cryptographic keys’ vulnerabilities, several studies noted the presence of public key reuse. While the phenomenon of private key sharing was extensively studied, the prevalence of public key sharing on the Internet remains largely unknown. In this work, we perform a large-scale analysis of public key reuse within the PKI ecosystem. We investigate the presence and distribution of duplicate X.509 certificates and reused RSA public keys across a large collection containing over 314 million certificates and over 13 million SSH keys collected by different sources at different times. We analyze the cryptographic weaknesses of duplicate certificates and reused keys and investigate the reasons and sources of reuse. Our results reveal that certificate and key sharing are common and persistent. Our findings show over 10 million certificates and 17 million public keys are reused across time and shared between our collections. We observe keys with non-compliant cryptographic elements stay available for an extended period of time.

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Publication Details

Journal
IEEE Transactions on Networking
Published
2024-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/tnet.2024.3495617
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Access Control and Trust
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
1.13
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article

Measuring and Characterizing Propagation of Reuse RSA Certificates and Keys Across PKI Ecosystem

Natalia Stakhanova, Enrico Branca, Andrei Natadze, Fatemeh Nezhadian et al.
1 citations
IEEE Transactions on Networking
Access Control and Trust
1.13
article

Measuring and Characterizing Propagation of Reuse RSA Certificates and Keys Across PKI Ecosystem

Natalia Stakhanova, Enrico Branca, Andrei Natadze, Fatemeh Nezhadian, Anna Barzolevskaia
article en
1 citations

Abstract

The insecurities of public-key infrastructure on the Internet have been the focus of research for over a decade. The extensive presence of broken, weak, and vulnerable cryptographic keys has been repeatedly emphasized by many studies. Analyzing the security implications of cryptographic keys’ vulnerabilities, several studies noted the presence of public key reuse. While the phenomenon of private key sharing was extensively studied, the prevalence of public key sharing on the Internet remains largely unknown. In this work, we perform a large-scale analysis of public key reuse within the PKI ecosystem. We investigate the presence and distribution of duplicate X.509 certificates and reused RSA public keys across a large collection containing over 314 million certificates and over 13 million SSH keys collected by different sources at different times. We analyze the cryptographic weaknesses of duplicate certificates and reused keys and investigate the reasons and sources of reuse. Our results reveal that certificate and key sharing are common and persistent. Our findings show over 10 million certificates and 17 million public keys are reused across time and shared between our collections. We observe keys with non-compliant cryptographic elements stay available for an extended period of time.

IEEE Transactions on NetworkingVol. 33(2)
University of Saskatchewan (CA)
Openalex Percentile: Top 15%
Access Control and Trust
1.13
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