The Wealth Effect in WTO Dispute Settlements: Analysing International Economic Law as a Normal Good

The objective of the article is to introduce a theoretical endeavor aimed at evaluating the potential validity of empirical results within the realm of economic theory. The existing literature and empirical evidence indicate that wealthier participants within the World Trade Organization exhibit a propensity for regular engagement with dispute settlement mechanisms in the field of international economic law. This uneven pattern of utilization of the dispute settlement mechanism implies that the global institution, serving as a provider of global public goods within an economic context, assumes attributes akin to a normal good. Accordingly, the article attempts to answer the question: What theoretical basis explains why wealthier countries in the World Trade Organisation engage more frequently in dispute settlement mechanisms under international economic law, and how does this reflect the characteristics of international economic law as a normal good in the context of global public goods? This article employs a methodology that combines literature synthesis with pay-off matrix analysis to examine the dynamics of dispute settlement among member countries of the World Trade Organisation with varying economic power. This methodological approach seeks to foster comprehension of the empirical patterns. The analysis finds that the discrete nature of the global public good results in its normal characteristics. The article concludes that addressing the disparities in engagement with dispute settlement mechanisms is essential for the World Trade Organisation to meet the demands of its member countries and effectively provide global public goods.