A Perfect Fit? - Towards Containers on Microkernels
Containers are a light weight alternative to virtual machines, building on sandboxed processes whose permissions are restricted by additional security mechanisms such as seccomp-bpf. However, these mechanisms increase the kernel's attack surface, thus prompting new security challenges. In this paper, we ask the question of whether a system with processes properly restricted by design enables a container infrastructure with better security posture. For instance, microkernels with capability-based access control provide container-style isolation out of the box. On the basis of real-world CVEs, we argue that this conceptual simplicity actually results in a better security posture than that typically found on monolithic systems.
Authors
- Till Miemietz (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-5896-2432)
- Viktor Reusch (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0009-0989-4737)
- Adam Lackorzyński (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4679-1728)
- Matthias Hille (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8816-4656)
- Michael Roitzsch (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2416-6537)
- Hermann Härtig (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8357-2594)
- Max Kurze (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-3404-2569)
Institutions
- Barkhausen Institut (DE)
- Technische Universität Dresden (DE)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2024-11-19
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3702637.3702957
- Primary Topic
- Security and Verification in Computing
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00