The value of screening tools in cartel cases
In this paper, we analyze the value of screening tests for competition authorities in cartel cases to raise red flags about possible cartels and as a deterrence on new or existing cartels. We start by looking at one of the main problems of screen tests: false positives. We show that multiple screen tests can function as a useful tool to reduce false positives. We then study the legal foundations of screen tests considering the EU competition law and build a case to use screen tests to trigger dawn raids.
Authors
- Ronny Gjendemsjø
- Malin Arve (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7399-8284)
- Armando J. Garcia Pires (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6174-3735)
- Frode André Skjeret
- Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7732-1927)
Institutions
- BC Research (Canada) (CA)
- Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NO)
- Centre for Research and Development (ZW)
- University of Bergen (NO)
- Norwegian School of Economics (NO)
Publication Details
- Journal
- European Competition Journal
- Published
- 2024-11-18
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2024.2428029
- Primary Topic
- Merger and Competition Analysis
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00