The Human Being as ‘Compound’: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human Nature
The intuitively right answer to the question ‘What am I?’ is not ‘an incorporeal spirit’, but ‘a human being’. Aquinas reflects this common-sense view when he says that ‘the human is no mere soul, but a compound of soul and body.’ And Descartes, despite his notorious dualistic thesis that I am a substance that does not need anything material in order to exist, insists nevertheless that the human mind-body compound is a genuine unity in its own right, not a mere soul making using of a body. This paper argues for the enduring philosophical importance of this notion of our ‘compound’ nature as human beings, and explores its significance across three principal dimensions – the psychological, the phenomenological, and the moral.
Authors
- John Cottingham (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5205-0323)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Filozofia
- Published
- 2024-11-15
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.9.1
- Primary Topic
- Medieval Philosophy and Theology
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00