On Procedural Safeguards of the Rights of the Accused and Suspect in Termination of Criminal Prosecution on Non-Rehabilitating Grounds

The institute of termination of criminal cases (criminal prosecution) on non-rehabilitating grounds has long raised questions in the theory of criminal procedure regarding its legitimacy. Many authors see a significant logical contradiction between this institute and the principle of presumption of innocence, which is essential for protecting human rights. However, this issue cannot be resolved by declaring the question of guilt in cases terminated on these grounds as “open”, or by simply replacing the term “finding of guilt” with the term “ascertaining of guilt”. It is proposed to address this issue within the framework of legal interpretation of the concept and essence of presumptions, including the presumption of innocence. By providing that the accused is considered innocent until proven guilty in accordance with the law and established by a court verdict that has entered into legal force, the presumption of innocence applies only to a specific situation where the criminal process ends with a guilty verdict. However, it operates more broadly outside of this situation – as a mechanism for distributing the burden of proof between the parties in the process, which is used only until it is no longer necessary, that is, when the process of proving guilt is not completed by any final decision in the criminal case (not just a guilty verdict), and only until that moment can it be stated that the accused is considered innocent. Among such decisions are procedural decisions to terminate a criminal case (prosecution) on non-rehabilitating grounds, in which the investigator, taking into account the above, ascertain the person’s guilt in committing a crime and informs them of this.