The influence of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance on management tone manipulation – evidence from China

Purpose This paper explores the association between directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) and management tone manipulation. Design/methodology/approach This study uses data from A-share listed non-financial companies from 2009 to 2021 as its sample for empirical tests. In addition, the study relies on text analysis and the construction of models to investigate the relationship between D&O insurance and management tone manipulation. Findings The authors find that the purchase of D&O insurance will lead to management tone manipulation in the “management discussion and analysis” part of companies’ annual reports, and operating risk and agent cost are the two paths for the effect. Further analysis shows that having a male CEO and employing high-quality auditors can weaken the positive impact of D&O insurance on tone manipulation. Originality/value This paper provides a new approach for studying the literature related to D&O insurance and management behavior, and the findings enrich our understanding of the influencing factors and the mechanism of management tone manipulation, thus revealing policy implications for further standardization of the terms and system of D&O insurance in China.