From Design to Disclosure

We study the role of hard information in contractual and market settings in which the receiver can flexibly adjust allocations and transfers in response to the sender's disclosure. These settings include monopoly pricing, insurance contracting, and policy negotiations. Across these settings, the sender is worst off if she reveals her type completely because the receiver would then adjust the terms of trade to extract her surplus. Taking this feature as our central departure from the literature, we characterize the entire set of equilibrium payoffs in these disclosure games. We prove an equivalence result: a payoff profile can be approximated by an equilibrium of the disclosure game if and only if it can be achieved through information design. Thus, there exist equilibria in which the sender obtains approximately her commitment payoff.

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Publication Details

Journal
The Review of Economic Studies
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdag125
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Applications
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

From Design to Disclosure

S. Nageeb Ali, Andreas Kleiner, Kun Zhang
2 citations
The Review of Economic Studies
Game Theory and Applications
article

From Design to Disclosure

S. Nageeb Ali, Andreas Kleiner, Kun Zhang
article en
2 citations

Abstract

We study the role of hard information in contractual and market settings in which the receiver can flexibly adjust allocations and transfers in response to the sender's disclosure. These settings include monopoly pricing, insurance contracting, and policy negotiations. Across these settings, the sender is worst off if she reveals her type completely because the receiver would then adjust the terms of trade to extract her surplus. Taking this feature as our central departure from the literature, we characterize the entire set of equilibrium payoffs in these disclosure games. We prove an equivalence result: a payoff profile can be approximated by an equilibrium of the disclosure game if and only if it can be achieved through information design. Thus, there exist equilibria in which the sender obtains approximately her commitment payoff.

The Review of Economic Studies
Pennsylvania State University (US), University of Bonn (DE), The University of Queensland (AU), Auburn University (US)
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Game Theory and Applications
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