A.A. Gromyko and Security Policy: Helsinki compromise (to the 115th anniversary of A.A. Gromyko)

The article continues the study of the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko in the formation, development and maintenance of security policy, its principles and structural elements. The subject of the article is the research of the preparation, content and prospects of the development of the Helsinki Compromise. On August 1, 1975, this compromise was enshrined in the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The article consists of four sections. The first section is dedicated to the problem of the connections between the Western interpretation of progress and the possible influence on the Western world. This problem will be scientifically examined in further articles. In the second section, the author proves that the main task of A.A. Gromyko in 1975 was to agree on the compromise as quickly as possible and then to begin with the main directions of cooperation between states. In the third section, the author analyzes the content of the compromise. In addition, the most important peculiarity (no existence of a common and specific project for all countries) is highlighted. In the fourth section, the author characterizes A.A. Gromyko's ideas about the prospects of the development of the Helsinki compromise. What is new is the interpretation of the CSCE decisions in 1975, the interpretation of the meaning and contradictions in the Gromyko system. The sources of the article are published documents of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, the use of which can be explained methodologically. It was important for the author to conduct the analysis on the basis of the foreign partners' assessment of the statements made by the Soviet Foreign Minister during official negotiations (outer reflection). The author's reasoning should be understood in the context of his earlier article in the journal.