Requirements for Designing a Fail-Safe Defense Supply Network

Abstract Defense supply networks are critical for national security. These supply networks are currently designed using the cyber-physical construct to be lean. An unintended consequence of a lean supply network is that it is fragile and not fail-safe. We propose to design the defense supply network as a cyber-physical-social system that will result in a resilient fail-safe supply network that accommodates both variations and disruptions thus allowing us to dynamically manage lead times, address a systemic response for variations and disruptions to reduce or eliminate failure. We recognize the Government, Supplier and User to be the stakeholders. To frame the problem in the context of Dilemmas faced by the three stakeholders we use the Dilemma Triangle Method. The Dilemmas are then analyzed and resolved via the development of a Requirements List within the current defense sustainment “Machine” model outlined in the Art of the Possible (AoP). The application and examination of Dilemmas through the lens of the AoP based constraints management system is further specified to include satisficing resolutions to the identified Dilemmas rooted in a preliminary Requirements List. The Requirements List is foundational for designing a defense supply network that is failsafe. In this paper, we propose a method for identifying the requirements for designing fail-safe supply networks to satisfy multiple stakeholders. We illustrate the efficacy of the approach using the defense supply network as an example. Our focus is on the method rather than the results per se.