The partial abolition of the rule in <i>Hollington</i> v <i>Hewthorn</i> in Seychelles and the admissibility of criminal convictions in civil trials: Analysing s. 29 of the Evidence Act

Section 29(1) of the Seychelles Evidence Act provides that a criminal conviction is admissible in civil proceedings as evidence that the person who was convicted committed the offence in question. Thus s. 29(1) partially reverses the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn . Section 29(2) of the same Act provides that ‘[i]n a trial, other than in a civil trial for defamation, in which by virtue of this section a person…is proved to have been convicted of an offence by or before a court in the Republic, he shall be taken to have committed that offence unless the contrary is proved.’ The Supreme Court held that s. 29 ‘imported’ s. 11 of the United Kingdom Civil Evidence Act (1968) ‘into our laws’. In this article, the author demonstrates how courts have interpreted s. 29. He also suggests ways in which s. 29 could be interpreted to deal with foreign convictions. He argues that notwithstanding s. 29, the Hollington Rule is still applicable to earlier civil findings. Thus the findings of a court in earlier civil proceedings are inadmissible in subsequent civil proceedings. In Esparon v Philo , the Court of Appeal, the highest court in Seychelles, interpreted s. 29(2) in a manner that creates room for the argument that a person who challenges the admissibility of his conviction in civil matters has to prove his/her innocence. It is argued, inter alia , that the Court's decision should not be interpreted as imposing this very high threshold. It is enough if he proves that the person's trial was a miscarriage of justice.