Impact of hospital‐physician vertical integration on physician‐administered drug spending and utilization

We estimate the effects of hospital-physician vertical integration on spending and utilization of physician-administered drugs for hematology-oncology, ophthalmology, and rheumatology. Using a 100% sample of Medicare fee-for-service medical claims from 2013 to 2017, we find that vertical integration shifts treatments away from physician offices and toward hospital outpatient departments. These shifts are accompanied by increases in physician-administered drug administration spending per procedure for all three specialties. Spending on Part B drugs also increases for hematologist-oncologists. At the same time, physician treatment intensity, as measured by the number of beneficiaries who receive drug infusions/injections and the number of drug infusions, decreases across all three specialties. These results suggest that the incentives of the Medicare reimbursement system, particularly site-of-care payment differentials and outpatient drug reimbursement rates, interact with vertical integration to lead to higher overall spending. Policies and merger guidelines should attempt to restrain spending increases attributed to vertical integration.

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Publication Details

Journal
Health Economics
Published
2024-11-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4909
Citations
3
Primary Topic
Healthcare Policy and Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
3.39

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article

Impact of hospital‐physician vertical integration on physician‐administered drug spending and utilization

Christopher Whaley, Xiaoxi Zhao, Jonathan Levin
3 citations
Health Economics
Healthcare Policy and Management
3.39
article

Impact of hospital‐physician vertical integration on physician‐administered drug spending and utilization

Christopher Whaley, Xiaoxi Zhao, Jonathan Levin
article en
3 citations

Abstract

We estimate the effects of hospital-physician vertical integration on spending and utilization of physician-administered drugs for hematology-oncology, ophthalmology, and rheumatology. Using a 100% sample of Medicare fee-for-service medical claims from 2013 to 2017, we find that vertical integration shifts treatments away from physician offices and toward hospital outpatient departments. These shifts are accompanied by increases in physician-administered drug administration spending per procedure for all three specialties. Spending on Part B drugs also increases for hematologist-oncologists. At the same time, physician treatment intensity, as measured by the number of beneficiaries who receive drug infusions/injections and the number of drug infusions, decreases across all three specialties. These results suggest that the incentives of the Medicare reimbursement system, particularly site-of-care payment differentials and outpatient drug reimbursement rates, interact with vertical integration to lead to higher overall spending. Policies and merger guidelines should attempt to restrain spending increases attributed to vertical integration.

Health EconomicsVol. 34(2)
RAND Corporation (US), Brown University (US)
National Institute on Aging
Openalex Percentile: Top 6%
Healthcare Policy and Management
3.39
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Impact of hospital‐physician vertical integration on physician‐administered drug spending and utilization — Christopher Whaley, Xiaoxi Zhao, et al. · Health Economics (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS