Compensation and Necessity in War

I argue that morally justified harms collaterally inflicted on civilians in war can yield compensatory duties – and that a failure to compensate post bellum renders in bello attacks retroactively unjust. Such attacks are unjust on the grounds that they violate the constraint of necessity, in the following way: the option of attacking-and-compensating is less harmful relative to the option of attacking-and-not-compensating (and typically no less effective at achieving the war’s aims). In making this point, I argue that we should evaluate the candidate courses of actions diachronically – that is, in a way that mereologically conjoins the ex ante attacks with ex post compensation. I then argue that a foreseeable risk of failing to compensate post bellum can affect the evidence-relative moral liability of those engaged in the in bello attacks. The upshot is that the moral significance of compensation for rights-infringements in war is not limited to jus post bellum, but also has profound effects on jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The US and select allies are in a position, even now, to affect the moral status of some of the military operations undertaken in the Middle East over the past two decades, by deciding whether to compensate those civilians whose rights were infringed. Neglecting to do so retroactively transforms tragic but potentially justified rights-infringements into gratuitously unjustified rights-violations. I end the article by addressing several practical quandaries that such a view seems to raise.