Literal and Controllable Paraconsistency

The principle of explosion asserts that any formula can be derived from any pair of other contradictory formulas. Paraconsistent logic is typically regarded as a logic in which the universal validity of this principle is questioned. Therefore, a key point is determining when the validity can be considered universal to classify a logic as paraconsistent. A pertinent example to illustrate this point is the calculus CB1 that admits the principle but only for negated formulas, i.e., from any set {α, ∼α} any other formula follows if and only if α is of the form ∼γ. Another example is Sette’s calculus P1, which is paraconsistent at the level of variables but not complex formulas. Both serve as compelling examples of the so-called borderline cases. In this paper, we examine several calculi expected to be paraconsistent at the level of literals. It means that a pair of formulas, α and ∼α, can yield any β if, and only if α is neither a propositional variable nor is its iterated negation. Furthermore, it is assumed that in some calculi presented here, β must adhere to specific restrictions. Once these conditions are satisfied, we refer to calculus as paraconsistent in a “controllable manner”.

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Publication Details

Journal
Logic and Logical Philosophy
Published
2024-11-02
DOI
https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2024.027
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.78
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article

Literal and Controllable Paraconsistency

Janusz Ciuciura
1 citations
Logic and Logical Philosophy
Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
2.78
article

Literal and Controllable Paraconsistency

Janusz Ciuciura
article en
1 citations

Abstract

The principle of explosion asserts that any formula can be derived from any pair of other contradictory formulas. Paraconsistent logic is typically regarded as a logic in which the universal validity of this principle is questioned. Therefore, a key point is determining when the validity can be considered universal to classify a logic as paraconsistent. A pertinent example to illustrate this point is the calculus CB1 that admits the principle but only for negated formulas, i.e., from any set {α, ∼α} any other formula follows if and only if α is of the form ∼γ. Another example is Sette’s calculus P1, which is paraconsistent at the level of variables but not complex formulas. Both serve as compelling examples of the so-called borderline cases. In this paper, we examine several calculi expected to be paraconsistent at the level of literals. It means that a pair of formulas, α and ∼α, can yield any β if, and only if α is neither a propositional variable nor is its iterated negation. Furthermore, it is assumed that in some calculi presented here, β must adhere to specific restrictions. Once these conditions are satisfied, we refer to calculus as paraconsistent in a “controllable manner”.

Logic and Logical Philosophy
Institute of Philosophy (RU)
Openalex Percentile: Top 8%
Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
2.78
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