Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Policy Simulation: Strategic Governance in the Redevelopment of the Urban Village in Guangzhou

The scarcity of land drives urban village redevelopment projects, which involve interest redistribution among stakeholders with distinct demands. This paper utilizes evolutionary game theory and simulation methods, constructing a tripartite game model under the institutional arrangement of bottom-up with private developer funding. This study identifies the stable strategies and evolutionary trends of the tripartite interactions under four distinct scenarios and validates these strategies through simulations. The redevelopment of XC village validates the assumptions of the model and theoretical analysis, suggesting that when private developers adopt forced demolition strategies, although villagers ultimately choose to sign the contract of property exchange, it can easily lead to social conflicts. These research findings can enlighten the government to form a tripartite alliance to smooth urban village redevelopment.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Land
Published
2024-11-08
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/land13111867
Citations
8
Primary Topic
Urban and Rural Development Challenges
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
15.66

Funders

Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Policy Simulation: Strategic Governance in the Redevelopment of the Urban Village in Guangzhou

Qiuxiang Li, Dinghuan Yuan, Yang Fu, Jiaxin Li
8 citations
Land
Urban and Rural Development Challenges
15.66
article

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Policy Simulation: Strategic Governance in the Redevelopment of the Urban Village in Guangzhou

Qiuxiang Li, Dinghuan Yuan, Yang Fu, Jiaxin Li
article en
8 citations

Abstract

The scarcity of land drives urban village redevelopment projects, which involve interest redistribution among stakeholders with distinct demands. This paper utilizes evolutionary game theory and simulation methods, constructing a tripartite game model under the institutional arrangement of bottom-up with private developer funding. This study identifies the stable strategies and evolutionary trends of the tripartite interactions under four distinct scenarios and validates these strategies through simulations. The redevelopment of XC village validates the assumptions of the model and theoretical analysis, suggesting that when private developers adopt forced demolition strategies, although villagers ultimately choose to sign the contract of property exchange, it can easily lead to social conflicts. These research findings can enlighten the government to form a tripartite alliance to smooth urban village redevelopment.

LandVol. 13(11)
Jinan University (CN), Shenzhen University (CN), Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics (CN)
National Natural Science Foundation of China, Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, Jinan University, Shenzhen University, Jilin Office of Philosophy and Social Science, Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation of Guangdong Province
Sustainable cities and communities
Openalex Percentile: Top 1%
Urban and Rural Development Challenges
15.66
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.