Proper names as speech acts

Abstract In this paper, I question the idea that proper names are merely used to refer to things or individuals. However, I am not going to use predicativism to prove this point. I will somehow look at things from the point of view of scholars like Frege or Kripke. I consider that this idea (that proper names are merely used to refer, at least when they are in argument positions) stems from a view of language that does not throw proper light on contextuality as discussed by Mey, Jacob. 2001. Pragmatics . Oxford: Wiley. From the very beginning, I argue that the issue can be seen in a better light through a theory of language use that considers language games as embedded in a society and a culture. I accept the idea that there are norms for introducing names in society and for using them in an appropriate way. Even if, for most philosophers, referring is the basic function of proper names, I propose that in a number of cases proper names are not essentially used to refer (although it is possible that the name allows a combination of referring and other functions). The referring function of names broadly correlates with the assertive function of the utterance in which the name occurs or with speech acts whose aim is to modify reality and, therefore, persuade, modify, create, promote, destroy, etc. objects or individuals (often referred to with proper names). However, there are other types of speech acts where proper names are not only used to refer, but, instead, to call someone (another case is scolding someone or a dog). Intentions clearly emerge in context. The same utterance may have more than one function, from the illocutionary point of view, but a proper name, as situated in different contexts, may have more than one perlocutionary function. I argue that while the speech act of referring is always a diagonal speech act, the speech act of calling someone (by the use of a proper name) is not a diagonal speech act but a self-sufficient, autonomous, primary speech act. Hence there is a clear difference between referring through an assertion and referring as part of calling, where referring is incorporated into the main speech act as part of the explicit illocutionary force of the speech act. In an assertion, referring is a prerequisite to providing a referent about which a property is asserted. Predication and reference are intertwined. In a speech act other than an assertion, there need not be a predicate, and referring and calling (or some other speech act) are connected. I propose that the learning of the speech act of calling by the use of a name requires certain syntactic considerations, that prima facie contradict Chomsky’s binding theory. I then put forward the view that learning one’s name requires, at some stage, knowledge of the semantics of de se structures.