Stigma and Rawlsian Liberalism

Stigma can be deeply morally troubling. For many Rawlsian liberals, the appropriate stance for the state to adopt is one of anti-stigma.1 By this I do not simply mean that the liberal state should seek to mitigate the downstream consequences of stigma—though it should certainly do that too.2 Stigma is, plausibly, objectionable independently of such consequences. Rather, the view I have in mind is that the liberal state should aim at undermining the very stigmatizing attitudes and associated social norms that account for the presence of stigmas in the first place.3 On the face of it, it can seem puzzling that Rawlsian liberals would commit themselves to this position. After all, a distinguishing feature of Rawlsian liberalism is that it imposes demanding restrictions on what counts as legitimate justification for government action: Reciprocity Principle: When making political decisions, citizens must rely only on considerations that they can reasonably expect all reasonable people to accept.4 But there often is reasonable disagreement about stigmatizing attitudes. Many people believe, for example, that it is immoral to sell sex. The persistence of such beliefs and associated social norms is, we might suppose, implicated in the ongoing stigmatization of sex work. But our objections to this belief, insofar as we have them, cannot themselves count in favor of using the state to undermine public support for the belief. This is precisely the sort of consideration that the Reciprocity Principle is meant to exclude. So how then can the liberal state be justified in opposing stigmatizing attitudes in general, given that many of them (including some that are implicated in the most morally troubling stigmas) are subject to reasonable disagreement? The literature furnishes us with two strategies. First, there is the strategy inspired by Rawls himself (1999 [1971]): the problem with stigma is that it threatens the “social bases of self-respect” via the production of shame. Call this the “Self-Respect Strategy.” Second, some Rawlsian liberals argue that stigma should be rejected because of its dependence on hierarchical social relations, which are independently objectionable (e.g., Anderson (1999)). Call this the “Hierarchy Strategy.” The promise of such strategies is that they offer us reasons for opposing the patterning of stigmatizing responses within a community without requiring us to take a stand on the content of stigmatizing attitudes themselves. When lots of people within a community take up and communicate stigmatizing attitudes, that can threaten putatively uncontroversial liberal values in ways that do not depend on the content of such attitudes being objectionable. In this paper I will argue that whilst both strategies have something going for them, neither is fully satisfactory on its own. Whilst the Self-Respect Strategy identifies a compelling reason why Rawlsian liberals should oppose stigmas it leaves many pressing questions about the strategy of opposing stigmas unanswered. For starters, some stigmas are more troubling than others. Amongst the stigmas that seem most morally urgent are those which, for example, target racialized, sexual, or religious minority identities. But there are also stigmas which target anti-social behavior of various kinds, wealthy and powerful individuals who are guilty of personal moral failure, or even (in some quarters) those who are themselves responsible for perpetuating, for example, racist stigmas. Whilst Rawlsian liberals can maintain that all of these stigmas are (as such) problematic, we still need some guidance as to where our political priorities should lie.5 It is not clear how far a general appeal to self-respect can get us on its own. By contrast, the Hierarchy Strategy helps orientate us with respect to the question of priority. Those stigmas which depend on the most morally troubling social hierarchies also seem to be amongst the most pressing cases from a political perspective. The trouble with the Hierarchy Strategy is its underlying normative concern with relating as social equals. Whilst we do have a clear sense that some hierarchies are deeply morally problematic, it is less clear that this is because they involve some agents relating as socially inferior to others. After all, there are many unequal social relations—such as between teacher and student—that are not obviously objectionable. Of course, we cannot reject out of hand the various solutions in the philosophical literature that have been offered to this challenge.6 The point is simply that any solution which rests on an appeal to a general complaint against relating as socially inferior to others will be highly contentious. It would be desirable, from a political perspective, to avoid such grounds. The solution, I argue, is to find a new role for considerations of hierarchy within the justification for opposing stigmas. We should hold, with the Self-Respect Strategy, that our basic normative concern with stigma is the threat that it poses to our self-respect. But we need some guide as to when this threat is most pronounced. Attending to considerations of hierarchy supplies us with just such resources. Threats to self-respect are often most pronounced when the targets of stigma occupy a low position within a social hierarchy, in virtue of the stigmatized trait they are taken to bear, and this hierarchy has a fairly pervasive reach within their social world. The article proceeds as follows. In section 2 I handle some preliminaries. What is stigma? What would it mean for the liberal state to adopt a politics of anti-stigma? What limits does the Reciprocity Principle impose on the justification that could be given for such a politics? In Section 3 I discuss the Self-Respect Strategy and its limitations as it stands. In Section 4 I address the Hierarchy Strategy. I highlight the intuitive promise of appealing to considerations of hierarchy but also criticize the way in which proponents of the Hierarchy Strategy have made use of them. Finally, in Section 5, I develop my own strategy that appeals to considerations of hierarchy in a new way that helps address the limitations of the Self-Respect Strategy. I also explore what this account might imply for our approach to stigma and anti-stigma in contexts where many of those who contribute to stigma are themselves marginalized in some respects. The account is thus amenable to broadly “intersectional” considerations.7 There are a number of descriptive accounts of stigma which can be found in the philosophical, sociological, and criminological literature.8 For my purposes it is not necessary to choose between them. It will suffice to point to some fairly uncontroversial features of stigma that any complete account of stigma should support for the that stigma these features can be found in many features will why stigma would a target for the Self-Respect and Hierarchy in 3 and First, stigmas a to stigmatizing When a is taken to a is the target of of and on the of of For example, that is to that “social behavior of that they to to themselves in the of the when there is have been to by and or by of social and It is not clear that in the of such stigmatizing the that of a trait are would be for stigma Second, stigmatizing responses the of stigma as in some way by the of that all are at but only those which are with our of what a given of should out that stigmatization the community by a of This in the normative that community are to the stigmatizing responses in from some social often with associated to such this of stigma on the what would it mean for the state to adopt a politics of anti-stigma in the sense which is consideration The can be by that there are many which are to opposing them does not commit the state to a politics of anti-stigma in my For example, a might be a because of their stigmatized But from the that the liberal state can against such it does not that it can also adopt a politics of anti-stigma in my This is because we could a in which such are but in which of stigma the legitimate of such the politics of anti-stigma some for Rawlsian from the demanding that such liberals take there to be on legitimate of political on their view from the that liberal are by reasonable disagreement amongst that this is an feature of them. By the for liberalism that citizens to their own at deeply opposing on the most pressing for the as as there is a question of how political justification should to reasonable the of the liberal state in a way that is still (in some to For the purposes of this I going to that Rawlsian liberals the as a point to guide us these Reciprocity Principle: When making political decisions, citizens must rely only on considerations that they can reasonably expect all reasonable people to The that is between accounts of how this is justified as a to the by reasonable The Reciprocity Principle a between or on the one hand and considerations on the The is taken to religious (e.g., that is the of many moral beliefs (e.g., that sex is and (e.g., that should be as a of The Reciprocity Principle that citizens not appeal to these considerations to their in an (e.g., as a of or simply as a The Reciprocity Principle could in such contexts or only to a of I the the Reciprocity Principle that citizens should in such only on public reasons that they can reasonably expect all reasonable people to are taken to liberal values such as and social as as many of the of The is that there is some of considerations which reasonable citizens not which reasonable citizens can reasonably expect them to The of citizens is out in of their of these citizens can thus rely on for the purposes of political justification with the of the Reciprocity The that such restrictions on justification for the politics of anti-stigma can thus be as follows. The politics of anti-stigma us to take a in the of stigmatizing attitudes in the that lots of people in the community that it is immoral to sell this a of associated social norms and stigmatizing responses that are in the In it is deeply implicated in the stigmatization of sex But the view that sex is immoral is also a of a moral that is subject to reasonable insofar as we reject that belief, this cannot count in favor of using the state as a for undermining support for the belief. The Reciprocity Principle considerations this from political The the that many stigmas not are to stigmatizing attitudes with many stigmas that are deeply morally troubling. I take the stigmatization of sex to be such a This the for the of consideration that Rawlsian liberals might on in support of a general to the politics of We are often for the purposes of political to appeal to the content of stigmatizing attitudes as the for our objections to We must features of stigma that threaten political values which we can reasonably be to independently of our about stigmatizing attitudes. This can us with public reasons to aim at stigmatizing attitudes within the because such attitudes are but because of the role they in In the two I will discuss and some about two of this The first Self-Respect that the reason the liberal state should adopt the politics of and seek to attitudes in the is that stigma is a threat to the social bases of self-respect. This has a Rawlsian Rawls that self-respect is the most (1999 By Rawls that have a use a of the of these is by the of is a in this sense because it seem or some have for we the will to for citizens can thus reasonably be to the of their disagreement a of beliefs (including those which are implicated in It would be and not I take it, to be with self-respect in any more way than with what Rawls its “social is, for example, the that citizens self-respect on account of themselves to have a personal moral does not of By contrast, when a self-respect is by political (e.g., the bases of self-respect that are are in the of Stigma often to occupy a between these The threat it poses to the bases of self-respect need not by by the state or even by the political community as a it is by the social norms that are in the community of the of against which they are The that this for our self-respect is that a in our own or to the a in the of our is of that self-respect (1999 it is necessary for this to be amongst that we find and and by others who are and their Stigma this because it stigmatizing responses of the The of stigma thus to and to their This is not but is by that for the of this that for there is some or to which and within which the that are for are by The is that whilst the of stigma are in by of some community to which they we might reasonably that there is some to which they in which they do the of that is necessary to support a self-respect. This for example, their or a community of people who their I we should only be by this up to a First, we have some reason to that Rawls has how of a such against the of amongst of stigma are to Second, even stigma is an feature of social it is a fairly pervasive This from the feature of stigma that I in the that only that are within many of are targets of being taken to a stigma at the very the social bases of self-respect in a far more position than those of This even some individuals are in against to their self-respect by of This us to a more general When to we need to be with both self-respect and with self-respect to the can thus be in the Whilst self-respect can be in even when a is taken to a stigma (e.g., they from some these are to the social bases of self-respect given the presence of stigma as a Of course, to self-respect this of and we should not that such can of in the of I will to this point in Section The that I have been we can reasonably be to on the of and stigma threatens the social bases of that then this us a reason to seek to attitudes within the community even when those attitudes themselves (e.g., sex is are that we can reasonably The problem with this in its state of is that it does not to some questions about the politics of The most general way of this is that stigmatized in many not all stigmas us as or morally urgent to the of the most troubling cases are those which target racialized, sexual, and minority identities. But it is that there are also stigmas against immoral such as it is certainly to that such cases do not us with the sense of because the of stigma have themselves of the political So we might that they have to some their to about such But even we are to this in such the more general strategy of moral and public norms to which it for all and to in to the more troubling cases of from the less troubling will not get Rawlsian liberals very This is because there are cases of stigma that do not seem or morally urgent to the as the cases but where the is not to such public is the of a wealthy or powerful who is as a of stigma because of some moral it be that Rawlsian liberals to adopt a to all stigmas on the that it threatens the social bases of self-respect. could thus that the liberal state should at the very from all the cases of stigma But the politics of anti-stigma that I to the liberal state to more than The liberal state to aim at attitudes within the It that the of cannot be What is it about stigmas against racialized, sexual, and religious minority that a on the The that stigma as such threatens the social bases of self-respect does not us any on this The general of is to a more There seem to be cases in which the stigmatized trait is precisely the trait of stigmatizing others. that (in some quarters) being a racist is a stigmatized Rawlsian liberal that as a of stigma this is (as such) less than and would be with some of or But we should not that the also a role in some the very that the politics of anti-stigma might the self-respect of those very citizens to that seek to as It might do by a clear to of that their as citizens should be by only with the general that stigma threatens the social bases of it is not clear where we should in the to self-respect at and which has a on the resources. this section by that I do not take these objections to be against the Self-Respect Strategy. Rather, they point us the need to develop it in more This is the of Section In a the way to these questions of within the Self-Respect Strategy is to to where the to self-respect In one this an of a But considerations can also to orientate our In to this I first need to discuss one strategy for the politics of anti-stigma within Rawlsian The Hierarchy in support of the politics of anti-stigma from within Rawlsian liberalism on on that unequal social are at objectionable in independently that is from their downstream such as their on an of The view thus a of the of which is amongst the liberal values we can reasonably be to for the purposes of political this of to a can be in support of the politics of The problem with stigmas on this view is that they depend on a of unequal social is, they depend on social norms that some of the community as to those who are taken to the But such hierarchies are then we have reason to aim at the of attitudes within the community that those norms which hierarchical social thus the stigmatizing of those as of of of the at is within the This the does not depend on an to the content of the stigmatizing attitudes themselves. The also has some when it to the questions of just in with the Self-Respect Strategy. many of the most troubling stigmas also depend on some of the most cases of hierarchy, hierarchies of and the of what is morally troubling about these cases of hierarchy appeals to the objectionable at the of such relations, then we can use normative in a concern with to why some stigmas those which depend on such are more morally and pressing than others. But face a is, the underlying normative concern with hierarchy must be against the that there are many unequal social that are not obviously For example, many people are not by the that of their there will be cases that such given some general features of the First, as out social hierarchies in the first a moral but a an to and features of a social Second, to the of the of social hierarchy that are in the philosophical social hierarchies an of social the between and or between the of and to as But they also hierarchies of and hierarchies of or to only a it does not seem to that we have a and against relating as socially inferior to others. This has been by many both and to the general of the of in have thus to address the in various they have to the strategy of which unequal social are objectionable. For example, many have that some of the most social hierarchies are those which are in a sense socially The point of this is thus not to any of the solutions that have Rather, it is simply to highlight that the is a to within a Rawlsian liberal Of course, the that is in some sense an uncontroversial political should not the that it has some But any solution to the that on a of the which social is objectionable (e.g., in virtue of its social and will be contentious. there is in that the to will with a politics of In what I to from this of the Hierarchy Strategy is considerations of hierarchy have some for how we should develop a politics of it would be from the of Rawlsian liberalism we could such considerations to in a way that does not depend on a general complaint against relating as socially inferior to others. This is the of the the In to the politics of Rawlsian liberals must political values that are by where making this does not depend on to the content of stigmatizing attitudes themselves. The Self-Respect Strategy identifies a but the on its own to questions about which stigmas are most morally and The Hierarchy Strategy, on the an feature of these urgent their dependence on of social But the strategy also on a highly of the of that it would be to avoid for the purposes of political I to the of a concern with self-respect and considerations of hierarchy in a way which these The view that I is in one sense a of the Self-Respect Strategy. This is because it from an that proponents of that strategy on of what us about stigmas is the threat they to then we should be most by the stigmas that the threat to The is to considerations that are to out such I that we take our from what in the Hierarchy Strategy. some of the most troubling cases of stigma are those that depend on of social But the for this is as the Hierarchy Strategy would have it, the of the hierarchies in The view that I will thus from that have been taken in the have that considerations of hierarchy are for the normative of stigma and of But for many of these it is our objections to hierarchy which our normative On my the of considerations of hierarchy in the normative of stigma is their role in pronounced to which are independently objectionable. Many have also that to self-respect are amongst the moral by social this by in a of the ways in which social hierarchies can pronounced to via the production of shame. This will new for the questions of in Section 3 about our political to The basic which this view is that our position in social hierarchies the threat that stigma poses to our self-respect. this the that have in the of by and For example, that in a in to their and general social than has a when by of the of in for example, be only in of the of in be a and of The of this to is that this of by is in the many of such as to which they are subject on account of their because this is a of social within of this is a but a the pervasive of There is some intuitive reason to that of this is to self-respect in virtue of its There is thus also some reason to that stigmas that target which are implicated in such of the of such shame. this is the about and then I a We should be to to self-respect when the targets of stigma occupy a low position within a social hierarchy, in virtue of the stigmatized trait they are taken to bear, and this hierarchy has a fairly pervasive reach within their social What would this imply when it to the questions of in of the Self-Respect this can be how would these our about which stigmas are most morally and with the of a wealthy or powerful who is taken to a stigma on account of some moral does the of this sort of stigma seem to have less on the than the of those stigmas that target racialized, sexual, or religious minority The strategy that I a The that are the target of stigma in the cases also their in low within fairly pervasive hierarchical social of the by this the of to self-respect. But the cannot be for wealthy or powerful individuals who are taken to a stigma on account of some moral Whilst such individuals are as inferior simply on account of being taken to a this trait does not them in any pervasive of hierarchical social to those of and the to which they are will not be of the that identifies as and of but the that be only in that one are not to the threat to self-respect that is of stigmas that target racialized, or religious minority cases in which the stigmatized trait is the trait of stigmatizing others. The strategy us to this of cases as in more and less In the the which out is that the trait of a does not one in a low position within a of hierarchical social On the when the of to a that being stigmatized as a racist can that one of social for reasons there can often be reasons to stigmas against within a politics of when the stigma is a of to But this an for many of There are of cases in which the who the of stigma most are themselves marginalized some an the that some are themselves marginalized against the of On the one it that this should not the stigmatized trait in question is being a racist not being But we might that even this an in those cases where the of and are we might how the of the stigmatized trait self-respect is in a because of as in Section it clear that an of the of any given threat to self-respect will depend on a of the various self-respect and that are in of social as and can as insofar as they one against morally of shame. But can that one as this we can the in Section one has to in which one from Stigma as a need of course, with this to the in It for example, that stigmas which target the of often this in it a position of of (e.g., can to these of thus some with the of The of these that is necessary for political priorities does not of a and to it is a virtue of the that it helps the broadly that are to the questions of in with the Self-Respect Strategy. We should be with those stigmas where the stigmatized trait one in a low position within a of fairly pervasive hierarchical social there are general reasons to that they will to self-respect. There is also an for the of within a politics of anti-stigma when the themselves occupy of social and of these it to with our I have that considerations of hierarchy can Rawlsian liberals to develop their to stigmas. But this is not by a normative concern with social hierarchy of the found in the literature on Rather, they should the dependence of stigmas on social hierarchies as us some to such as those that are of stigmas racialized, sexual, and minority identities. I would to for and of this for and to the also to and for and on fairly of the to for of its I from this article at the of and I to the for their and from a number of to this This by an and and a The of