CEO deaths and credit relationships: evidence from an emerging market

Abstract In a sample representing 40% of Peru’s formal economy, firms shocked by the death of their chief executive officer experience lower sales and a higher probability of exit, lower borrowing amounts and credit performance, and a reduced number of lenders compared with very similar firms. Existing lenders bear the negative consequences. Monthly risk assessments by lenders worsen immediately after the death events. The negative effects are observed across various firm sizes, while industry characteristics, incorporation, and family ties are relevant dimensions of heterogeneity. Lenders with a longer relationship history, and those less constrained for loan-making, protect themselves by introducing collateral clauses. (JEL D25, G30, L25).

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Publication Details

Journal
The Journal of Law Economics and Organization
Published
2024-10-04
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewae027
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

CEO deaths and credit relationships: evidence from an emerging market

Gabriel Natividad
The Journal of Law Economics and Organization
Corporate Finance and Governance
article

CEO deaths and credit relationships: evidence from an emerging market

Gabriel Natividad
article en

Abstract

Abstract In a sample representing 40% of Peru’s formal economy, firms shocked by the death of their chief executive officer experience lower sales and a higher probability of exit, lower borrowing amounts and credit performance, and a reduced number of lenders compared with very similar firms. Existing lenders bear the negative consequences. Monthly risk assessments by lenders worsen immediately after the death events. The negative effects are observed across various firm sizes, while industry characteristics, incorporation, and family ties are relevant dimensions of heterogeneity. Lenders with a longer relationship history, and those less constrained for loan-making, protect themselves by introducing collateral clauses. (JEL D25, G30, L25).

The Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationVol. 41(3)
University of Piura (PE)
Openalex Percentile: Top 67%
Corporate Finance and Governance
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