Key Schedule Guided Persistent Fault Attack

<italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">Persistent Fault Analysis</i> (PFA) is a powerful analysis technique proposed in CHES 2018, which utilizes those faults that are injected before execution and persist throughout the encryption. However, when it is applied to the block cipher which has multiple S-boxes, the key cannot be recovered in just one attack. The adversary has to conduct the fault attack several times and inject faults into all the distinct S-boxes. In this paper, we propose <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">Key Schedule Guided Persistent Fault Attack</i> (KGPFA), which utilizes the key schedule to guide the fault injection and fault analysis. By analyzing the key schedule, KGPFA exploits the relations between the key leakages caused by the same faulty S-box in various rounds. It can reduce the number of attacks and the number of faults required to recover the key. Our major contributions are twofold. Firstly, in the fault injection step, we provide <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">Key Schedule Guided Persistent Fault Injection</i> (KGPFI) strategies to reduce the number of attacks and the number of faults under the assumption of both ciphertext-only and known-plaintext attacks. Secondly, in the fault analysis step, as our target ciphers are Feistel-based, we propose the <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">Ineffective Algebraic Persistent Fault Analysis</i> (IAPFA) to extend the usage of <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">Algebraic Persistent Fault Analysis</i> (APFA) in the ineffective persistent fault setting. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our technique, we apply KGPFA to four widely used block ciphers with multiple S-boxes, DES, 3DES, LBlock, and Camellia. In our experiment, in the ciphertext-only attack, the key of DES can be recovered with 300 ineffective ciphertexts (coresponding to 827 ciphertexts) and four faulty S-boxes within 12.18min. Under the assumption of known-plaintext, the key of DES is recovered within two faulty S-boxes in 2.34h. For LBlock, the key is recovered with two faulty S-boxes and 100 ineffective ciphertexts (coresponding to 6211 ciphertexts) in 1.16min.