Maimonidean and Crescian: Spinoza on moral education and human perfection

This article’s question is whether Spinoza understands the highest human perfection – which he equates with both our highest good and the love of God – as a theoretical state, consisting in having knowledge and the perfection of beliefs, or as a practical state, consisting in having virtue and the perfection of action. Consequently, the article is also partly about how Spinoza understands moral education, that is, whether the education necessary for achieving the highest human perfection is fundamentally theoretical or practical in nature. The article answers this question by considering Spinoza’s view of the highest good in the context of Maimonides and Crescas. The article argues that Spinoza adopts elements of both philosopher’s views, including Crescas’s view that the highest good must also be a practical state of virtue, which means that Spinoza must understand moral education as resulting in the perfection of action as well as knowledge.