Deterrent effects of targeted sanctions by mainland China on Taiwan: evidence from 2021–2 sanction events

Abstract We investigate the deterrent effects of a firm‐targeted sanction and a politician‐targeted sanction deployed by mainland China against Taiwan to deter support for ‘Taiwan independence’. In the short run, we find that the signal sent by the targeted sanctions generated deterrence to firms that were not directly sanctioned, but were politically inclined towards ‘Taiwan independence’. Specifically, we find that those firms that donated more to the party that supports ‘Taiwan independence’, while investing in mainland China before the sanction, experienced a decrease in stock return. In terms of magnitude, for those firms entirely leaning towards ‘Taiwan independence’, their stock returns are expected to decrease by around 1.3–1.5 percentage points after the sanction events, which translates into a decrease in the overall market value of sampled firms by 0.305–0.604%. In the medium to long run, we find no evidence that firms affected by the deterrence of the sanction reduced their investment in mainland China as a behaviour response.