Resources collection strategy of emergency materials based on evolutionary game model in complex network

Purpose In recent years, the frequency of emergencies, such as natural disasters and public health crises, has markedly increased globally. These occurrences have introduced new challenges to national public security systems and emergency management capabilities. Post-disaster humanitarian logistic operations involve the collection of emergency relief resources to mitigate the impact of disasters in affected areas. Effective coordination among governments, enterprises and charities is essential to enhance the efficiency of these operations. This study employs evolutionary game theory to explore the strategic interactions and behavioral patterns among these key stakeholders during the collection of emergency materials. Design/methodology/approach A tripartite evolutionary game model involving governments, enterprises and charities is developed. Subsequently, to validate the theoretical findings, a scale-free network is constructed for the purpose of numerical simulations. As this network evolves, both the edges between nodes and the strategy choices of the nodes also change. Numerical simulations are conducted using the network to examine the sensitivity of factors influencing strategic choices among game stakeholders. Findings According to the model simulation results, penalties significantly influence government regulation strength, while enterprise philanthropic behavior is mainly affected by penalties, profit transfer benefits and trust loss. For charities, strategic choices are primarily driven by penalties, tax subsidies, illegal operation benefits and charitable costs. The findings provide a theoretical basis for governments, enterprises and charities to select the sensible strategy. Originality/value Our study establishes a dynamic network of edges and nodes evolving over time to analyze the strategic evolutionary paths of governments, enterprises and charities from a micro perspective. The results assist governments, enterprises and charities in making more strategic decisions.

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Publication Details

Journal
Kybernetes
Published
2024-11-08
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1108/k-06-2024-1601
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.56
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article

Resources collection strategy of emergency materials based on evolutionary game model in complex network

Guohua Qu, Rudan Xue
2 citations
Kybernetes
Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
0.56
article

Resources collection strategy of emergency materials based on evolutionary game model in complex network

Guohua Qu, Rudan Xue
article en
2 citations

Abstract

Purpose In recent years, the frequency of emergencies, such as natural disasters and public health crises, has markedly increased globally. These occurrences have introduced new challenges to national public security systems and emergency management capabilities. Post-disaster humanitarian logistic operations involve the collection of emergency relief resources to mitigate the impact of disasters in affected areas. Effective coordination among governments, enterprises and charities is essential to enhance the efficiency of these operations. This study employs evolutionary game theory to explore the strategic interactions and behavioral patterns among these key stakeholders during the collection of emergency materials. Design/methodology/approach A tripartite evolutionary game model involving governments, enterprises and charities is developed. Subsequently, to validate the theoretical findings, a scale-free network is constructed for the purpose of numerical simulations. As this network evolves, both the edges between nodes and the strategy choices of the nodes also change. Numerical simulations are conducted using the network to examine the sensitivity of factors influencing strategic choices among game stakeholders. Findings According to the model simulation results, penalties significantly influence government regulation strength, while enterprise philanthropic behavior is mainly affected by penalties, profit transfer benefits and trust loss. For charities, strategic choices are primarily driven by penalties, tax subsidies, illegal operation benefits and charitable costs. The findings provide a theoretical basis for governments, enterprises and charities to select the sensible strategy. Originality/value Our study establishes a dynamic network of edges and nodes evolving over time to analyze the strategic evolutionary paths of governments, enterprises and charities from a micro perspective. The results assist governments, enterprises and charities in making more strategic decisions.

KybernetesVol. 55(2)
Shanghai University (CN), Shanghai University of Engineering Science (CN), Shanxi University of Finance and Economics (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 34%
Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
0.56
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