Resilience Assessment of Cyber-Attacks on Distributed Secondary Control in Microgrid

With the rapid advancement of modern communication technologies that has resulted into the high penetration of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) into electric power distribution networks, it is important to develop an efficient robust secondary control mechanism, such as distributed co-operative control, to ensure stability as well as to maintain frequency synchronization and restore voltage in cyber-physical AC microgrids. However, this control system remains vulnerable to cyber-attacks such as False Data Injection Attacks (FDIA) and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. This paper presents the cyber vulnerability and resiliency associated with distributed secondary control mechanisms in AC microgrids under FDIA, DoS, and a combination of these (FDIA+DoS). The proposed method involves implementing a performance function for systematically evaluating microgrid resilience and developing a consensus-based control approach to mitigate the effects of these cyber-attacks. Detailed scenarios consider both individual and simultaneous attacks to provide a comprehensive understanding of their (FDIA only, DoS only, and combination of FDIA and DoS) impacts. Test results highlight the effectiveness of the proposed consensus-based control approach in maintaining microgrid system's stability from potential cyber threats.