Cyber-Attacks in Inverter-Based Islanded Microgrids Considering DER Dynamics

This paper analyzes how different cyber-attacks on control signals affect inverter-based islanded microgrids. Using measures of invulnerability (<tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$I$</tex>) and recoverability (R), the study assesses the impact of these attacks on system resilience <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$(\xi)$</tex>. It also considers the dynamic conditions introduced by distributed energy resources (DERs), such as high photovoltaic (PV) power generation with Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) charging, and low PV power production with BESS discharge. Simulations on an islanded microgrid with three inverters show that system resilience decreases in these scenarios. For instance, during low PV power and BESS discharging, false data injection attacks (FDIA) with a magnitude of 0.130 or higher completely reduced <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$I$</tex>, signifying system outages. Furthermore, combining FDIA with a jamming attack created a new hybrid attack that not only caused outages but also significantly decreased the <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$R$</tex> of the system, posing a serious threat to the system. Additionally, by combining these two metrics, we can calculate the resilience of the system and how these metrics contribute to it. These findings contribute to the cybersecurity field by highlighting the impact of cyber-attacks in the presence of DERs, enhancing our understanding and aiding in the development of effective mitigation strategies.