Changing European Minority Rights Standards

Abstract The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the only comprehensive international minority rights treaty, was adopted in 1995 to counter ethnocentric exclusionary tendencies characteristic of newly emerging democracies in East-Central Europe. It has been evaluated as largely successful in developing progressive standards on minority rights, while judged less efficient in implementing them across member states. This article shows on the example of Slovakia that this traditional narrative conceals another important one: while the Framework Convention’s monitoring body, the Advisory Committee, maintains formally progressive positions, in substance it is becoming more accommodating of exclusionary practices. By comparing the Advisory Committee’s standards expressed in its periodic opinions on Slovakia to developments on the ground, the article demonstrates that the international standards are in fact deteriorating. The Advisory Committee’s recent opinions are much more favourable to the Slovak government’s policies on minority rights. Yet, a detailed analysis shows that those policies have not become more minority-friendly in practice. In fact, in several ways they have regressed. The current acceptance of practices it criticized in the past is an important shift in the Advisory Committee’s position. Yet this shift is not reflected in its formal standards, which remain progressive. The analysis shows that the Advisory Committee’s lack of transparency in its monitoring procedures leads to a misrepresentation of the situation of minority rights, which provides cover for anti-minority practices. This makes it difficult for outside observers to evaluate the true state of minority rights and the effectiveness of international standards. In closing, the article engages with the normative assumptions behind the Advisory Committee’s approach. The Framework Convention does not have a strong enforcement mechanism, therefore cooperation with governments is essential to ensure compliance. However, by accommodating exclusionary practices, the Committee also legitimizes them. While valid arguments can be raised both for and against this approach, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of this trade-off because of its clandestine nature. More transparent monitoring would give legitimacy to an objective international standard, which the current approach risks undermining.