Parallel Communication Obliviousness: One Round and Beyond
This paper studies communication-oblivious algorithms under the massively parallel computation (MPC) model. The communication patterns of these algorithms follow a distribution dependent only on the definition of the underlying problem, the problem size N, and the number p of machines, but not on the specific input elements. Our objective is to understand when obliviousness necessitates --- or does not necessitate --- heavier communication compared to the traditional MPC model that does not enforce such a requirement. The first part of our investigation focuses on single-round algorithms. We prove that skew-free hashing, a fundamental problem solvable with load Õ(N/p) (with high probability or w.h.p.\ for short) under the traditional model, demands a load of nearly Ω(N) under communication obliviousness. Intriguingly, we show that hashing can still be applied in an oblivious manner to process any natural join in one round with a load complexity matching that of the best traditional MPC algorithm. The second part of our investigation studies compilation methods that convert a traditional MPC algorithm A into a communication-oblivious counterpart. Given an A that operates within l = poly(p) rounds and entails a load at most L = Ω(p log p) w.h.p., we can produce w.h.p.\ a communication-oblivious version running in 2l rounds with a load at most (1 + δ) L, where δ < 0 can be an arbitrarily small constant. Additionally, we establish hardness results indicating that the theoretical guarantees of our compilation can no longer be significantly improved.
Authors
- Yufei Tao (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3883-5452)
- Shiyuan Deng (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0007-7883-3458)
- R. Wang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0009-1630-9196)
Institutions
- Chinese University of Hong Kong (HK)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Proceedings of the ACM on Management of Data
- Published
- 2024-11-04
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3695832
- Primary Topic
- Cryptography and Data Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00