The Samaritan bureaucracy in international transfers

Abstract Conventional wisdom tells us that other-regarding sentiments are desirable as they yield positive social outcomes. However, the consequences of other-regarding behaviors are broadly ambiguous and may have unintended consequences, especially when they must pass through institutional filters. In this paper, we use the Samaritan’s Dilemma model to understand the perverse unintended consequences of institutionalized commitments to resource transfers expressed through international transfer organizations (ITOs), the collection of government and non-government international organizations involved in transferring foreign assistance. To do so, we maintain the core logic of the classic Samaritan’s Dilemma model but alter its assumptions to account for two features of international transfers. First, transfers are channeled through an ITO bureaucracy, which we call a “Samaritan Bureaucracy.” Second, the recipient effects that extend beyond a single person (the target recipient) to include various heterogeneous individuals. We illustrate these effects by analyzing two different harmful recipient effects—reinforcing a corrupt status quo and exacerbating social conflict.