Conviction or Consent? Tracing the Influence of Coalition Partners on Family Policy under Centre-Right Ministers

Abstract Many studies have analysed what could motivate centre-right governments to develop progressive family policies, given their historically traditionalist ideology. Updating classic institutionalist accounts, this article expands the focus beyond centre-right parties formally in charge. It argues that in coalition and minority governments, partisan veto players may act as agenda-setters, design policy reforms and successfully exert pressure to approve them through three mechanisms: agreements for government formation, conditions for government survival and bureaucratic continuity. Drawing on novel empirical data from interviews and document analysis, this article applies deductive process tracing to analyse the German parental allowance reform of 2006 and the Spanish 2017 paternity leave extension. The findings complement existing studies that focus on the agency of centre-right parties as ‘protagonists’ of these reforms, arguing that in some cases they have instead ‘consented’ to reforms proposed and supported by other parties.

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Publication Details

Journal
Government and Opposition
Published
2024-11-06
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2024.25
Citations
6
Primary Topic
Social Policy and Reform Studies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
13.39
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article

Conviction or Consent? Tracing the Influence of Coalition Partners on Family Policy under Centre-Right Ministers

Milan Thies, Manuel Alvariño
6 citations
Government and Opposition
Social Policy and Reform Studies
13.39
article

Conviction or Consent? Tracing the Influence of Coalition Partners on Family Policy under Centre-Right Ministers

Milan Thies, Manuel Alvariño
article en
6 citations

Abstract

Abstract Many studies have analysed what could motivate centre-right governments to develop progressive family policies, given their historically traditionalist ideology. Updating classic institutionalist accounts, this article expands the focus beyond centre-right parties formally in charge. It argues that in coalition and minority governments, partisan veto players may act as agenda-setters, design policy reforms and successfully exert pressure to approve them through three mechanisms: agreements for government formation, conditions for government survival and bureaucratic continuity. Drawing on novel empirical data from interviews and document analysis, this article applies deductive process tracing to analyse the German parental allowance reform of 2006 and the Spanish 2017 paternity leave extension. The findings complement existing studies that focus on the agency of centre-right parties as ‘protagonists’ of these reforms, arguing that in some cases they have instead ‘consented’ to reforms proposed and supported by other parties.

Government and OppositionVol. 60(3)
European University Institute (IT)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 1%
Social Policy and Reform Studies
13.39
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