Designing Simple Mechanisms
It matters whether real-world mechanisms are simple. If participants cannot see that a mechanism is incentive-compatible, they may refuse to participate or may behave in ways that undermine the mechanism. There are several ways to formalize what it means for a mechanism to be “simple.” This essay explains three of them, and suggests directions for future research.
Authors
- Shengwu Li (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2985-4240)
Institutions
- Harvard University Press (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- The Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Published
- 2024-11-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.38.4.175
- Citations
- 5
- Primary Topic
- Auction Theory and Applications
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 2.45