Fundamental Study on Detecting Hardware Trojans in Printed Circuit Boards Using Ring Oscillators

Threats arise when malicious circuits, known as hardware trojans (HT), are inserted into information devices, compromising security. These HTs can be inserted during the design and manufacturing process of devices, and thus, methods to detect them at the time of manufacturing have been studied. In recent years, it has been pointed out that HTs can also be inserted into parts such as printed circuit boards (PCBs) even after shipping, requiring detection throughout the lifetime of the device. To address this threat, sensing methods using analog circuits have been proposed, but their application is limited. In contrast, this paper proposes a method using a ring oscillator (RO), which can be generally implemented with digital circuits, to detect electrical changes caused by the insertion of HTs. Specifically, the wiring of the RO configured inside the IC is extended externally, and the changes in propagation delay caused by HT insertion on the wiring are detected as changes in the oscillation frequency of the RO. As a result of confirming the effectiveness of the proposed method through experiments, it was confirmed that the proposed method can be used to detect capacitance changes even when a small HT consisting of only a single transistor is connected to the wiring on the PCB.

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Publication Details

Published
2024-10-07
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/emccompo61192.2024.10742048
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.49
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article

Fundamental Study on Detecting Hardware Trojans in Printed Circuit Boards Using Ring Oscillators

Yu‐ichi Hayashi, Kôki Abe, Daisuke Fujimoto
1 citations
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
0.49
article

Fundamental Study on Detecting Hardware Trojans in Printed Circuit Boards Using Ring Oscillators

Yu‐ichi Hayashi, Kôki Abe, Daisuke Fujimoto
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Threats arise when malicious circuits, known as hardware trojans (HT), are inserted into information devices, compromising security. These HTs can be inserted during the design and manufacturing process of devices, and thus, methods to detect them at the time of manufacturing have been studied. In recent years, it has been pointed out that HTs can also be inserted into parts such as printed circuit boards (PCBs) even after shipping, requiring detection throughout the lifetime of the device. To address this threat, sensing methods using analog circuits have been proposed, but their application is limited. In contrast, this paper proposes a method using a ring oscillator (RO), which can be generally implemented with digital circuits, to detect electrical changes caused by the insertion of HTs. Specifically, the wiring of the RO configured inside the IC is extended externally, and the changes in propagation delay caused by HT insertion on the wiring are detected as changes in the oscillation frequency of the RO. As a result of confirming the effectiveness of the proposed method through experiments, it was confirmed that the proposed method can be used to detect capacitance changes even when a small HT consisting of only a single transistor is connected to the wiring on the PCB.

Nara Institute of Science and Technology (JP)
Affordable and clean energy
Openalex Percentile: Top 35%
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
0.49
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